/*
 * COPYRIGHT (c) International Business Machines Corp. 2001-2017
 *
 * This program is provided under the terms of the Common Public License,
 * version 1.0 (CPL-1.0). Any use, reproduction or distribution for this
 * software constitutes recipient's acceptance of CPL-1.0 terms which can be
 * found in the file LICENSE file or at
 * https://opensource.org/licenses/cpl1.0.php
 */

/***************************************************************************
                          Change Log
                          ==========
       4/25/03    Kapil Sood (kapil@corrent.com)
                  Added DH key pair generation and DH shared key derivation
                  functions.



****************************************************************************/


// File:  key_mgr.c
//

#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#include <string.h>             // for memcmp() et al

#include "pkcs11types.h"
#include "defs.h"
#include "host_defs.h"
#include "h_extern.h"
#include "tok_spec_struct.h"
#include "trace.h"

#include <openssl/crypto.h>

static CK_BBOOL true = TRUE, false = FALSE;

//
//
CK_RV key_mgr_generate_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
                           SESSION *sess,
                           CK_MECHANISM *mech,
                           CK_ATTRIBUTE *pTemplate,
                           CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *handle)
{
    OBJECT *key_obj = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *new_attr = NULL;
    CK_ULONG i, keyclass, subclass = 0;
    CK_BBOOL flag;
    CK_RV rc;


    if (!sess || !mech || !handle) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    if (!pTemplate && (ulCount != 0)) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    // it's silly but Cryptoki allows the user to specify the CKA_CLASS
    // in the template.  so we have to iterate through the provided template
    // and make sure that if CKA_CLASS is CKO_SECRET_KEY, if it is present.
    //
    // it would have been more logical for Cryptoki to forbid specifying
    // the CKA_CLASS attribute when generating a key
    //
    for (i = 0; i < ulCount; i++) {
        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
            keyclass = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *) pTemplate[i].pValue;
            if (keyclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
                TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
                return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
            }
        }

        if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE)
            subclass = *(CK_ULONG *) pTemplate[i].pValue;
    }


    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_DES) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_DES;
        break;
    case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_DES3) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_DES3;
        break;
#if !(NOCDMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_CDMF) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_CDMF;
        break;
#endif
    case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }
        if (mech->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_VERSION)) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID));
            return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
        }

        subclass = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
        break;
    case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_AES) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_AES;
        break;
    case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }


    rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, sess,
                                pTemplate, ulCount,
                                MODE_KEYGEN,
                                CKO_SECRET_KEY, subclass, &key_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_skel failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // at this point, 'key_obj' should contain a skeleton key.  depending on
    // the key type, we may need to extract one or more attributes from
    // the object prior to generating the key data (ie. variable key length)
    //

    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_des_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template);
        break;
    case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_des3_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template);
        break;
#if !(NOCDMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_cdmf_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template);
        break;
#endif
    case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_ssl3_pre_master_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template, mech);
        break;
#ifndef NOAES
    case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_aes_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template);
        break;
#endif
    case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
        rc = ckm_generic_secret_key_gen(tokdata, key_obj->template);
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        rc = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }

    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_ERROR("Key generation failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // we can now set CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE
    // to their appropriate values.  this only applies to CKO_SECRET_KEY
    // and CKO_PRIVATE_KEY objects
    //
    flag = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template, CKA_SENSITIVE, &attr);
    if (flag == TRUE) {
        flag = *(CK_BBOOL *) attr->pValue;

        rc = build_attribute(CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &flag, sizeof(CK_BBOOL),
                             &new_attr);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build attribute failed.\n");
            goto error;
        }
        template_update_attribute(key_obj->template, new_attr);

    } else {
        rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_SENSITIVE in key object template.\n");
        goto error;
    }


    flag = template_attribute_find(key_obj->template, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &attr);
    if (flag == TRUE) {
        flag = *(CK_BBOOL *) attr->pValue;

        rc = build_attribute(CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL),
                             &new_attr);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed\n");
            goto error;
        }
        if (flag == TRUE)
            *(CK_BBOOL *) new_attr->pValue = FALSE;

        template_update_attribute(key_obj->template, new_attr);

    } else {
        rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_EXTRACTABLE in key object template.\n");
        goto error;
    }

    /* add/update CKA_LOCAL with value true to the template */
    rc = build_attribute(CKA_LOCAL, &true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL), &new_attr);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed\n");
            goto error;
    }
    template_update_attribute(key_obj->template, new_attr);

    // at this point, the key should be fully constructed...assign
    // an object handle and store the key
    //
    rc = object_mgr_create_final(tokdata, sess, key_obj, handle);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_final failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }

    return rc;

error:
    if (key_obj)
        object_free(key_obj);

    *handle = 0;

    return rc;
}


//
//
CK_RV key_mgr_generate_key_pair(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
                                SESSION *sess,
                                CK_MECHANISM *mech,
                                CK_ATTRIBUTE *publ_tmpl,
                                CK_ULONG publ_count,
                                CK_ATTRIBUTE *priv_tmpl,
                                CK_ULONG priv_count,
                                CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *publ_key_handle,
                                CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *priv_key_handle)
{
    OBJECT *publ_key_obj = NULL;
    OBJECT *priv_key_obj = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *new_attr = NULL;
    CK_ULONG i, keyclass, subclass = 0;
    CK_BBOOL flag;
    CK_RV rc;

    if (!sess || !mech || !publ_key_handle || !priv_key_handle) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    if (!publ_tmpl && (publ_count != 0)) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    if (!priv_tmpl && (priv_count != 0)) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    // it's silly but Cryptoki allows the user to specify the CKA_CLASS
    // in the template.  so we have to iterate through the provided template
    // and make sure that if CKA_CLASS is valid, if it is present.
    //
    // it would have been more logical for Cryptoki to forbid specifying
    // the CKA_CLASS attribute when generating a key
    //
    for (i = 0; i < publ_count; i++) {
        if (publ_tmpl[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
            keyclass = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *) publ_tmpl[i].pValue;
            if (keyclass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
                TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
                return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
            }
        }

        if (publ_tmpl[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE)
            subclass = *(CK_ULONG *) publ_tmpl[i].pValue;
    }


    for (i = 0; i < priv_count; i++) {
        if (priv_tmpl[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
            keyclass = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *) priv_tmpl[i].pValue;
            if (keyclass != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) {
                TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
                return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
            }
        }

        if (priv_tmpl[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
            CK_ULONG temp = *(CK_ULONG *) priv_tmpl[i].pValue;
            if (temp != subclass) {
                TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
                return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
            }
        }
    }


    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_RSA) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_RSA;
        break;
    case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_EC) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }

        subclass = CKK_EC;
        break;
#if !(NODSA)
    case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_DSA) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }
        subclass = CKK_DSA;
        break;
#endif
/* Begin code contributed by Corrent corp. */
#if !(NODH)
    case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        if (subclass != 0 && subclass != CKK_DH) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
            return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
        }
        subclass = CKK_DH;
        break;
#endif
/* End  code contributed by Corrent corp. */
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }


    rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, sess,
                                publ_tmpl, publ_count,
                                MODE_KEYGEN,
                                CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, subclass, &publ_key_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_skel failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, sess,
                                priv_tmpl, priv_count,
                                MODE_KEYGEN,
                                CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, subclass, &priv_key_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_skel failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // at this point, 'key_obj' should contain a skeleton key.  depending on
    // the key type, we may need to extract one or more attributes from
    // the object prior to generating the key data (ie. variable key length)
    //

    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        rc = ckm_rsa_key_pair_gen(tokdata, publ_key_obj->template,
                                  priv_key_obj->template);
        break;
    case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        rc = ckm_ec_key_pair_gen(tokdata, publ_key_obj->template,
                                 priv_key_obj->template);
        break;
#if !(NODSA)
    case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        rc = ckm_dsa_key_pair_gen(tokdata, publ_key_obj->template,
                                  priv_key_obj->template);
        break;
#endif

/* Begin code contributed by Corrent corp. */
#if !(NODH)
    case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
        rc = ckm_dh_pkcs_key_pair_gen(tokdata, publ_key_obj->template,
                                      priv_key_obj->template);
        break;
#endif
/* End code contributed by Corrent corp. */
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        rc = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
        break;
    }

    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("Key Generation failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // we can now set CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE and CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE
    // to their appropriate values.  this only applies to CKO_SECRET_KEY
    // and CKO_PRIVATE_KEY objects
    //
    flag =
        template_attribute_find(priv_key_obj->template, CKA_SENSITIVE, &attr);
    if (flag == TRUE) {
        flag = *(CK_BBOOL *) attr->pValue;

        rc = build_attribute(CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &flag, sizeof(CK_BBOOL),
                             &new_attr);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed.\n");
            goto error;
        }
        template_update_attribute(priv_key_obj->template, new_attr);

    } else {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_SENSITIVE in key object template.\n");
        rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        goto error;
    }


    flag =
        template_attribute_find(priv_key_obj->template, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &attr);
    if (flag == TRUE) {
        flag = *(CK_BBOOL *) attr->pValue;

        rc = build_attribute(CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL),
                             &new_attr);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed.\n");
            goto error;
        }
        if (flag == TRUE)
            *(CK_BBOOL *) new_attr->pValue = false;

        template_update_attribute(priv_key_obj->template, new_attr);

    } else {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_EXTRACTABLE in key object template.\n");
        rc = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        goto error;
    }

    /* add/update CKA_LOCAL with value true to the keypair templates */
    rc = build_attribute(CKA_LOCAL, &true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL), &new_attr);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed\n");
            goto error;
    }
    template_update_attribute(publ_key_obj->template, new_attr);
    rc = build_attribute(CKA_LOCAL, &true, sizeof(CK_BBOOL), &new_attr);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("build_attribute failed\n");
            goto error;
    }
    template_update_attribute(priv_key_obj->template, new_attr);

    // at this point, the keys should be fully constructed...assign
    // object handles and store the keys
    //
    rc = object_mgr_create_final(tokdata, sess, publ_key_obj, publ_key_handle);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_final failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    rc = object_mgr_create_final(tokdata, sess, priv_key_obj, priv_key_handle);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_final failed.\n");
        // just calling object_free in the error path below would lead to a
        // double free error on session close - KEY 09/26/07
        object_mgr_destroy_object(tokdata, sess, *publ_key_handle);
        publ_key_obj = NULL;
        goto error;
    }

    return rc;

error:
    if (publ_key_obj)
        object_free(publ_key_obj);
    if (priv_key_obj)
        object_free(priv_key_obj);

    *publ_key_handle = 0;
    *priv_key_handle = 0;

    return rc;
}


//
//
CK_RV key_mgr_wrap_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
                       SESSION *sess,
                       CK_BBOOL length_only,
                       CK_MECHANISM *mech,
                       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_wrapping_key,
                       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key,
                       CK_BYTE *wrapped_key, CK_ULONG *wrapped_key_len)
{
    ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT *ctx = NULL;
    OBJECT *key1_obj = NULL;
    OBJECT *key2_obj = NULL;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;
    CK_BYTE *data = NULL;
    CK_ULONG data_len;
    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class;
    CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
    CK_BBOOL flag;
    CK_RV rc;


    if (!sess || !wrapped_key_len) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }

    rc = object_mgr_find_in_map1(tokdata, h_wrapping_key, &key1_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID));
        if (rc == CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID)
            return CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;

        return rc;
    }

    rc = object_mgr_find_in_map1(tokdata, h_key, &key2_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to acquire key from specified handle");
        if (rc == CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID)
            return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;

        return rc;
    }
    // is the key-to-be-wrapped EXTRACTABLE?
    //
    rc = template_attribute_find(key2_obj->template, CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &attr);
    if (rc == FALSE) {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_EXTRACTABLE in key template.\n");
        // could happen if user tries to wrap a public key
        return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
    } else {
        flag = *(CK_BBOOL *) attr->pValue;
        if (flag == FALSE) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE));
            return CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE;
        }
    }

    // what kind of key are we trying to wrap?  make sure the mechanism is
    // allowed to wrap this kind of key
    //
    rc = template_attribute_find(key2_obj->template, CKA_CLASS, &attr);
    if (rc == FALSE) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("CKA_CLASS is missing for key to be wrapped.\n");
        return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
    } else {
        class = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *) attr->pValue;
    }

    // pkcs11v2-20rc3, page 178
    // C_WrapKey can be used in following situations:
    // - To wrap any secret key with a public key that supports encryption
    // and decryption.
    // - To wrap any secret key with any other secret key. Consideration
    // must be given to key size and mechanism strength or the token may
    // not allow the operation.
    // - To wrap a private key with any secret key.
    //
    //  These can be deduced to:
    //  A public key or a secret key can be used to wrap a secret key.
    //  A secret key can be used to wrap a private key.

    switch (mech->mechanism) {
#if !(NOCDMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
#endif
    case CKM_DES_CBC:
    case CKM_DES3_ECB:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC:
    case CKM_AES_CTR:
    case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_AES_OFB:
    case CKM_AES_CFB8:
    case CKM_AES_CFB64:
    case CKM_AES_CFB128:
        if ((class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (class != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)) {
            TRACE_ERROR
                ("Specified mechanism only wraps secret & private keys.\n");
            return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
        }
        break;
    case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
    case CKM_DES_ECB:
    case CKM_AES_ECB:
    case CKM_AES_CBC:
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
    case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        if (class != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
            TRACE_ERROR("Specified mechanism only wraps secret keys.\n");
            return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
        }
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("The mechanism does not support wrapping keys.\n");
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }


    // extract the secret data to be wrapped
    //
    rc = template_attribute_find(key2_obj->template, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &attr);
    if (rc == FALSE) {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to find CKA_KEY_TYPE in key template.\n");
        return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
    } else {
        keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *) attr->pValue;
    }

    switch (keytype) {
#if !(NOCDMF)
    case CKK_CDMF:
#endif
    case CKK_DES:
        rc = des_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                               &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("des_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
    case CKK_DES3:
        rc = des3_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                                &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("des3_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
    case CKK_RSA:
        rc = rsa_priv_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                                    &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("rsa_priv_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#if !(NODSA)
    case CKK_DSA:
        rc = dsa_priv_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                                    &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("dsa_priv_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#endif
    case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET:
        rc = generic_secret_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only,
                                          &data, &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("generic_secret_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#ifndef NOAES
    case CKK_AES:
        rc = aes_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                               &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("aes_wrap_get_data failed.\n");
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#endif
    case CKK_EC:
        rc = ecdsa_priv_wrap_get_data(key2_obj->template, length_only, &data,
                                      &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("ecdsa_priv_wrap_get_data failed with rc=%s.\n",
                        ock_err(rc));
            return rc;
        }
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE));
        return CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE;
    }

    // we might need to format the wrapped data based on the mechanism
    //
    switch (mech->mechanism) {
#if !(NOCMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
#endif
    case CKM_DES_ECB:
    case CKM_DES_CBC:
    case CKM_DES3_ECB:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC:
        rc = ckm_des_wrap_format(tokdata, length_only, &data, &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("ckm_des_wrap_format failed.\n");
            if (data) {
                OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
                free(data);
            }
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#ifndef NOAES
    case CKM_AES_ECB:
    case CKM_AES_CBC:
    case CKM_AES_CTR:
    case CKM_AES_OFB:
    case CKM_AES_CFB8:
    case CKM_AES_CFB64:
    case CKM_AES_CFB128:
        rc = ckm_aes_wrap_format(tokdata, length_only, &data, &data_len);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("ckm_aes_wrap_format failed.\n");
            if (data) {
                OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
                free(data);
            }
            return rc;
        }
        break;
#endif
#if !(NOCMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
#endif
    case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
        // these mechanisms pad themselves
        //
        break;

    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
    case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        if (data) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
            free(data);
        }
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }

    ctx = (ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT *) malloc(sizeof(ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT));
    if (!ctx) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
        if (data) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
            free(data);
        }
        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
    }
    memset(ctx, 0x0, sizeof(ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT));

    // prepare to do the encryption
    //
    rc = encr_mgr_init(tokdata, sess, ctx, OP_WRAP, mech, h_wrapping_key);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("encr_mgr_init failed.\n");
        free(ctx);
        if (data) {
            OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
            free(data);
        }
        return rc;
    }
    // do the encryption and clean up.  at this point, 'value' may or may not
    // be NULL depending on 'length_only'
    //
    rc = encr_mgr_encrypt(tokdata, sess, length_only,
                          ctx, data, data_len, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len);
    if (data != NULL) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
        free(data);
    }
    encr_mgr_cleanup(ctx);
    free(ctx);

    return rc;
}


//
//
CK_RV key_mgr_unwrap_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
                         SESSION *sess,
                         CK_MECHANISM *mech,
                         CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes,
                         CK_ULONG attrib_count,
                         CK_BYTE *wrapped_key,
                         CK_ULONG wrapped_key_len,
                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_unwrapping_key,
                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *h_unwrapped_key)
{
    ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT *ctx = NULL;
    OBJECT *key_obj = NULL, *tmp_obj = NULL;
    CK_BYTE *data = NULL;
    CK_ULONG data_len;
    CK_ULONG keyclass = 0, keytype = 0;
    CK_ULONG i;
    CK_BBOOL found_class, found_type, fromend, isopaque = FALSE;
    CK_RV rc;
    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr = NULL;


    if (!sess || !wrapped_key || !h_unwrapped_key) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }

    rc = object_mgr_find_in_map1(tokdata, h_unwrapping_key, &tmp_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_ERROR("Failed to acquire key from specified handle");
        if (rc == CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID)
            return CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
        else
            return rc;
    }

    if (template_attribute_find(tmp_obj->template, CKA_IBM_OPAQUE, &attr) ==
        TRUE) {
        isopaque = TRUE;
    }

    found_class = FALSE;
    found_type = FALSE;

    /*
     * pkcs11v2-20
     * C_WrapKey can be used in following situations:
     * - To wrap any secret key with a public key that supports encryption
     *   and decryption.
     * - To wrap any secret key with any other secret key. Consideration
     *    must be given to key size and mechanism strength or the token may
     *    not allow the operation.
     * - To wrap a private key with any secret key.
     *
     * extract key type and key class from the passed in attributes
     */

    for (i = 0; i < attrib_count; i++) {
        switch (attributes[i].type) {
        case CKA_CLASS:
            keyclass = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *) attributes[i].pValue;
            found_class = TRUE;
            break;
        case CKA_KEY_TYPE:
            keytype = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *) attributes[i].pValue;
            found_type = TRUE;
            break;
        }
    }

    // we need both key class and key type in template.
    // we can be a bit lenient for private key since can extract key type
    // from BER-encoded information.

    if (found_class == FALSE ||
        (found_type == FALSE && keyclass != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE));
        return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
    }

    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
    case CKM_DES_ECB:
    case CKM_AES_ECB:
    case CKM_AES_CBC:
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
    case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
    case CKM_RSA_X_509:
        if (keyclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
            TRACE_ERROR("The specified mechanism unwraps secret keys only.\n");
            return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
        }
        break;
#if !(NOCMF)
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
    case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
#endif
    case CKM_DES_CBC:
    case CKM_DES3_ECB:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC:
    case CKM_AES_CTR:
    case CKM_AES_OFB:
    case CKM_AES_CFB8:
    case CKM_AES_CFB64:
    case CKM_AES_CFB128:
    case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
    case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
        if ((keyclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (keyclass != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)) {
            TRACE_ERROR("Specified mech unwraps secret & private keys only.\n");
            return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
        }
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("The specified mechanism cannot unwrap keys.\n");
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }

    // looks okay... do the decryption
    ctx = (ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT *) malloc(sizeof(ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT));
    if (!ctx) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
    }
    memset(ctx, 0x0, sizeof(ENCR_DECR_CONTEXT));

    rc = decr_mgr_init(tokdata, sess, ctx, OP_UNWRAP, mech, h_unwrapping_key);
    if (rc != CKR_OK)
        return rc;

    rc = decr_mgr_decrypt(tokdata, sess,
                          TRUE,
                          ctx, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len, data, &data_len);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    data = (CK_BYTE *) malloc(data_len);
    if (!data) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_HOST_MEMORY));
        rc = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
        goto error;
    }

    rc = decr_mgr_decrypt(tokdata, sess,
                          FALSE,
                          ctx, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len, data, &data_len);

    decr_mgr_cleanup(ctx);
    free(ctx);

    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("decr_mgr_decrypt failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // if we use X.509, the data will be padded from the front with zeros.
    // PKCS #11 specifies that for this mechanism, CK_VALUE is to be read
    // from the end of the data.
    //
    // Note: the PKCS #11 reference implementation gets this wrong.
    //
    if (mech->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509)
        fromend = TRUE;
    else
        fromend = FALSE;

    // extract the key type from the PrivateKeyInfo::AlgorithmIndicator
    //
    if (keyclass == CKO_PRIVATE_KEY) {
        rc = key_mgr_get_private_key_type(data, data_len, &keytype);
        if (rc != CKR_OK) {
            TRACE_DEVEL("key_mgr_get_private_key_type failed.\n");
            goto error;
        }
    }
    // we have decrypted the wrapped key data.  we also
    // know what type of key it is.  now we need to construct a new key
    // object...
    //

    rc = object_mgr_create_skel(tokdata, sess,
                                attributes, attrib_count,
                                MODE_UNWRAP, keyclass, keytype, &key_obj);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_skel failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // at this point, 'key_obj' should contain a skeleton key.  depending on
    // the key type.  we're now ready to plug in the decrypted key data.
    // in some cases, the data will be BER-encoded so we'll need to decode it.
    //
    // this routine also ensires that CKA_EXTRACTABLE == FALSE,
    // CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE == FALSE and CKA_LOCAL == FALSE
    //
    switch (keyclass) {
    case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
        rc = secret_key_unwrap(tokdata, key_obj->template, keytype, data,
                               data_len, fromend, isopaque);
        break;
    case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
        rc = priv_key_unwrap(key_obj->template, keytype, data, data_len,
                             isopaque);
        break;
    default:
        rc = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID;
        break;
    }

    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("key_unwrap failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    // at this point, the key should be fully constructed...assign
    // an object handle and store the key
    //
    rc = object_mgr_create_final(tokdata, sess, key_obj, h_unwrapped_key);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("object_mgr_create_final failed.\n");
        goto error;
    }
    if (data) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
        free(data);
    }

    return rc;

error:
    if (key_obj)
        object_free(key_obj);
    if (data) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(data, data_len);
        free(data);
    }

    return rc;
}


CK_RV key_mgr_get_private_key_type(CK_BYTE *keydata,
                                   CK_ULONG keylen, CK_KEY_TYPE *keytype)
{
    CK_BYTE *alg = NULL;
    CK_BYTE *priv_key = NULL;
    CK_ULONG alg_len;
    CK_RV rc;

    rc = ber_decode_PrivateKeyInfo(keydata, keylen, &alg, &alg_len, &priv_key);
    if (rc != CKR_OK) {
        TRACE_DEVEL("ber_decode_PrivateKeyInfo failed.\n");
        return rc;
    }
    // check the entire AlgorithmIdentifier for RSA
    //
    if (alg_len >= ber_rsaEncryptionLen) {
        if (memcmp(alg, ber_rsaEncryption, ber_rsaEncryptionLen) == 0) {
            *keytype = CKK_RSA;
            return CKR_OK;
        }
    }
    // Check only the OBJECT IDENTIFIER for DSA
    //
    if (alg_len >= ber_idDSALen) {
        if (memcmp(alg, ber_idDSA, ber_idDSALen) == 0) {
            *keytype = CKK_DSA;
            return CKR_OK;
        }
    }
    // Check only the OBJECT IDENTIFIER for EC
    //
    if (alg_len >= der_AlgIdECBaseLen) {
        if (memcmp(alg, ber_idEC, ber_idECLen) == 0) {
            *keytype = CKK_EC;
            return CKR_OK;
        }
    }

    TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE));
    return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
}


//
//
CK_RV key_mgr_derive_key(STDLL_TokData_t *tokdata,
                         SESSION *sess,
                         CK_MECHANISM *mech,
                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE base_key,
                         CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *derived_key,
                         CK_ATTRIBUTE *pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulCount)
{
    if (!sess || !mech) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    if (!pTemplate && (ulCount != 0)) {
        TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
        return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
    }
    switch (mech->mechanism) {
    case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
        if (!derived_key) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
            return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        }
        return ssl3_master_key_derive(tokdata, sess, mech, base_key,
                                      pTemplate, ulCount, derived_key);
        break;
    case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
        return ssl3_key_and_mac_derive(tokdata, sess, mech, base_key,
                                       pTemplate, ulCount);
        break;
/* Begin code contributed by Corrent corp. */
#ifndef NODH
    case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
        if (!derived_key) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
            return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        }
        return dh_pkcs_derive(tokdata, sess, mech, base_key,
                              pTemplate, ulCount, derived_key);
        break;
#endif
/* End code contributed by Corrent corp. */
    case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
        if (!derived_key) {
            TRACE_ERROR("%s received bad argument(s)\n", __func__);
            return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
        }
        return ecdh_pkcs_derive(tokdata, sess, mech, base_key, pTemplate,
                                ulCount, derived_key);
        break;
    default:
        TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
        return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
    }
}
